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IN SEARCH OF BEST EFFORTS: 
REINTERPRETING BLOOR V. FALSTAFF 
VICTOR P. GOLDBERG* 
When contracting parties cannot quite define their obligations, they often 
resort to placeholder language, like “best efforts.”  They (and their counsel) 
likely have little idea of what they might mean, but, so long as they avoid 
litigation, it will not matter much.  But “best efforts” clauses are on occasion 
litigated, and courts must read content into them.  In Bloor v. Falstaff, a 
casebook favorite,1 the court held that Falstaff’s lackluster promotional efforts 
for Ballantine beer violated its best efforts covenant.  So far as I can tell, no 
commentators have questioned this outcome.  Indeed, some commentators 
have found Falstaff’s breach so egregious as to provide not much of a test of 
the boundaries of “best efforts.”  Farnsworth, for example, says: 
“Unfortunately, its decision did relatively little to add precision to the meaning 
of ‘best efforts,’ since Kalmanovitz [of Falstaff] fell so far short of the mark.” 2 
“Best efforts” can only be defined contextually.  However, neither Judge 
Brieant at trial3 nor Judge Friendly on appeal,4 attempted to place the contract 
in its business context.  Had they framed the problem properly, the outcome 
 
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. 
 1. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).  Casebooks which reprint 
it as a main case include: STEVEN J. BURTON, CONTRACT LAW: SELECTED SOURCES MATERIALS 
448 (1995); JOHN D. CALAMARI ET AL., CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CONTRACTS 459 (2d ed. 
1989); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 
623 (5th ed. 1995); LON L.  FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 868 
(6th ed. 1996); ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 254 (2d 
ed. 1992); ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 280 (1988).  
The decision is briefly noted in the Knapp and Murray casebooks.  CHARLES C. KNAPP & 
NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 503 (3d ed. 
1993); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 260 (4th ed. 1991).  
The case is cited in Murphy and Speidel, but there is no further discussion.  EDWARD J. MURPHY 
& RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 792 (5th ed. 1997). 
 2. E. A. Farnsworth, On Trying to Keep One’s Promises: The Duty of Best Efforts in 
Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984).  “The opinion may seem somewhat 
disappointing in that the breach was sufficiently flagrant that the court did not define ‘best efforts’ 
with precision.”  E. A. FARNSWORTH & W. F. YOUNG, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS—
FIFTH EDITION, MANUAL FOR TEACHERS 186-87. 
 3. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y 1978). 
 4. Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 601 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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would have been different.  Falstaff was not contracting to be a distributor for 
another beer producer, the remarks of numerous commentators 
notwithstanding.5  The fact that some of Ballantine’s compensation was 
contingent upon Falstaff’s selling effort makes it appear similar to a 
distribution agreement.  But the purpose of the contingent compensation is 
quite different and that should be taken into account when interpreting the 
contract.  Thus, while I am sympathetic to the Goetz-Scott argument that the 
contract should be interpreted to maximize expected joint profits,6 I disagree 
with their application of it to this case (which, in effect, treats the deal as if it 
were a distribution arrangement). 
The essential feature of the contract is that Ballantine was exiting the beer 
business and was making a one-shot sale of some of its assets to Falstaff.  That 
purpose is crucial for understanding the role of this “best efforts” clause.  The 
buyer of an asset is naturally concerned about the asset’s quality.  There are 
numerous devices for assuring the buyer that he is not purchasing a “lemon.”7  
The seller could, for example, provide extensive representations and 
warranties.  Or, the buyer could incur significant due diligence expenses.  Or, 
the seller could make a portion of its compensation contingent upon the quality 
of the asset.  The royalty arrangement in this transaction, essentially an 
“earnout,” served precisely this role.  Profits or, in this case, gross sales, serve 
as a “meter,” an imperfect measure of the quality of the asset.  Because an 
earnout alters the buyer’s incentive structure, the seller must limit the buyer’s 
ability to take advantage of the meter’s imperfections.  The best efforts clause 
can best be understood as an attempt to cope with that problem.  The question 
the court should have asked was: did Falstaff opportunistically redirect 
revenues away from the meter (Ballantine’s sales)?  And the facts make clear 
that Falstaff did not. 
 
 5. See, e.g., J.C. Bruno, “Best Efforts” Defined, 71 MICH. B. J. 74, 76 (1992) (“Falstaff 
agreed to distribute Ballantine beer, in addition to its own label, in exchange for payments to 
Ballantine . . .”); Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L. J. 583, 
608-9 (“The plaintiff signed a contract in which Falstaff, the defendant, agreed to use its ‘best 
efforts’ to promote the sale of Ballantine beer (which continued to be produced by Ballantine 
breweries).”); Lawrence S. Long, Best Efforts as Diligence Insurance: In Defense of “Profit Über 
Alles,” 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1728, 1733 (1986) (“Falstaff would not have agreed to spend money 
up front marketing Ballantine if Ballantine could later have come back and demanded a higher 
royalty . . .”); ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 291 (“What 
changes do you think would be made in a new agreement between these two companies? Is that 
relationship likely to be renewed after litigation?  Was litigation necessarily the best solution 
here?”). 
 6. See Charles J. Goetz  & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089 (1981). 
 7. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset 
Pricing, 94 YALE L. J. 239, 262-64 (1984). 
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In Part I, I summarize the facts and the two opinions.  In Part II, I explore 
the role of the contingent compensation in the sale of an asset and apply that 
analysis to the facts of Bloor.  In Part III, I speculate on how a court might 
properly frame the question absent help from counsel.  Even if courts choose 
not to be so proactive, the implicit argument is that litigators can (and should) 
frame their arguments in a more transactionally-sensitive way. 
I. THE BACKGROUND 
A. The Facts 
Ballantine, a regional brewery selling low-priced beer primarily in the New 
York area, was sold to Investors Funding Corporation (IFC), a real estate firm, 
in 1969.8  IFC lost a considerable amount of money with Ballantine, and left 
the beer business in 1972.  It kept the brewery (eventually selling it for non-
beer making purposes),9 selling off the remainder of the business to Falstaff, a 
larger regional brewery that had no presence in the New York market. The 
parties had explored the deal for a few months but the final negotiations 
 
 8. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 263.  The record of the case is available on microfiche from the 
author; citations to the record will be limited to material not available in the public record. 
 9. They attempted, unsuccessfully, to convert the brewery into an industrial park.  On Oct. 
21, 1974, IFC and its wholly-owned subsidiary IFC Collateral Corporation both filed for 
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.  On Nov. 1, 1974, James Bloor was 
appointed Trustee, replacing the Dansker management.  On Dec. 23, 1980, while other suits were 
still ongoing, Judge Bonsal approved a reorganization plan in which Helmsley Enterprises would 
inject new money.  See In re Investors Funding Corp., 8 B.R. 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  Other 
litigation stemming from the IFC bankruptcy dragged on for over a decade.  The Trustee Bloor 
had taken the position that a massive fraud had been perpetrated on the Company, and he sued the 
Danskers, the banks, the accountants, IFC’s outside legal counsel, various others and, of course, 
Falstaff.  The Trustee’s claims against the principal accountants were dismissed.  See Investors 
Funding Corp. v. Dansker, 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  Claims of the Trustee against the 
outside directors, IFC’s outside legal counsel and various other individuals were also dismissed.  
See Investors Funding Corp. v. Dansker, 566 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d sub nom.  Bloor 
v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1985).  Other claims of the 
Trustee against IFC’s outside legal counsel were finally dismissed in 1986.  See Investors 
Funding Corp. v. Dansker, 635 F. Supp. 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).  In addition, holders of the stock 
and debentures of IFC filed five class actions against the Danskers, the accountants and the banks 
which were consolidated for trial.  The securities holders settled with the banks and the 
accountants on March 17, 1981.  See Investors Funding Corp. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 
9 B.R. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  In an unrelated matter, some of IFC’s officers faced criminal 
charges, stemming from the development of the George Washington Plaza shopping center.  They 
were charged with conspiracy to give a $100,000 bribe to Burt Ross, the Mayor of Fort Lee, New 
Jersey.  On March 28, 1975, former IFC officers Norman Dansker, Donald Orenstein and Stephen 
Haymes were convicted of bribery.  See United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).  They eventually served six months in jail.  See Walter H. 
Waggoner, Terms Cut for 4 in Ft. Lee Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, February 4, 1978, at 1. 
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involved a marathon session of three days with no breaks for meals, 
characterized by one of the participants as “negotiation-by-endurance.”10  
Falstaff paid $4,000,000 plus a royalty of fifty cents per barrel for six years.  
Ballantine’s sales in the IFC years were about 2.2 million barrels per year, well 
below the 1964 peak of 4.4 million barrels.11  Had Falstaff maintained 
Ballantine’s sales volume the royalty payment would have been over 
$1,000,000 per year.  For acquisition purposes, the rule of thumb in the beer 
business at that time was to value the target at about $4 per barrel, which 
would have put a value on Ballantine of about $8.5-$9 million.12  Falstaff 
agreed to use “best efforts” to promote and maintain a high volume of sales 
and further agreed to pay a cash sum in the event of a substantial 
discontinuance of distribution under the Ballantine brand name.  The terms 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
Falstaff’s strategy was to enter the New York market, selling beer from its 
Cranston, Rhode Island brewery, under both the Ballantine and Falstaff labels.  
Falstaff was a premium beer, Ballantine a low price beer, although, in fact, the 
beer in the two containers was identical. Falstaff expected that buying the 
Ballantine assets would help it in three ways.  First, Ballantine had a trademark 
that was potentially valuable, especially in the New York area.  Second, it had 
an existing distribution network in the New York area (it was servicing some 
25,000 accounts); Falstaff would not have to assemble one to sell Ballantine 
and could use that network to develop the market for Falstaff.  Third, 
consolidating production in the Cranston facility and closing Ballantine’s 
Newark brewery, which had been operating at less than fifty percent capacity, 
would increase the capacity utilization rate, thereby decreasing average 
production costs. 
The record is mixed as to the appropriate weighting of these components.  
In his letter to the Justice Department immediately following the acquisition, 
Falstaff’s outside counsel described the purpose: 
  You requested that I confirm Falstaff’s purpose in acquiring the Ballantine 
brands and the steps which will be taken to produce and market Ballantine beer 
and ale.  The primary purpose of the acquisition is to utilize the excess 
productive capacity of Falstaff’s seven plants. 
*  *  * 
 
 10. Judge Brieant scolded the parties for their method, but acknowledged that “it was the 
manner chosen by the parties for their own purposes, and they must each accept the 
consequences . . . They should have conducted themselves in a more mature fashion.  Had they 
done so, at least some of the later disputes and difficulties could have been anticipated and 
avoided.” Bloor, 454 F.Supp. at 276 n.11. 
 11. Pl.’s Ex. 9 at A1618. 
 12. Falstaff’s Ralph Weir’s Dep. at A1576. 
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  A further purpose of the acquisition (though not a major one) is that 
opportunity is afforded to introduce Falstaff beer on a premium price level in 
the New York metropolitan market.  Any such introduction would necessarily 
be low-keyed, since Falstaff does not have the resources to support any other 
kind of entry into this market.13 
A Falstaff internal document written at the very beginning of the process put 
much more weight on using the acquisition to facilitate Falstaff’s entrance into 
the New York market: 
  Let us further assume that, since Ballantine is a declining brand, that 
Falstaff will not support and promote the brand, but, rather, cut advertising and 
promotion expenses to the bone and expect a rapid decline in sales of 
approximately 20% per year.  Let us assume further that Falstaff uses the direct 
distribution system set up by Ballantine in the 5 boroughs and Northern New 
Jersey to promote Falstaff at a premium price.  Since this is a large market, the 
market entry costs will be high . . . . In other words, the Ballantine distribution 
system will increase its distribution of Falstaff to offset the loss of volume for 
Ballantine such that the plants continue to produce at the capacity level the 
same as when Ballantine production was initiated. 
*  *  * 
  Thus, under these assumptions, it does not seem worthwhile to purchase 
Ballantine except for the entry to the N.Y. markets.14 
In any event, it did not work out.  Falstaff continued to promote Ballantine 
at about the same level as IFC had, but sales kept falling and red ink spilling.  
Falstaff claimed losses in 1972-75 of $22 million on its Ballantine operations.  
In 1975, Paul Kalmanovitz acquired effective control of Falstaff and 
dramatically changed its operations.15  In particular, he cut the Ballantine 
advertising budget nearly 90%, cut sales personnel, and closed or phased out 
four of the six distribution centers.  Ballantine’s sales plummeted.  Some of the 
decline was attributable to the general sales decrease of regional beers, but 
Ballantine’s sales fell faster than the sales of similarly situated beers. 
 
 13. Pl.’s Ex. 23 at A1677-79. 
 14. Falstaff internal document entitled “Opportunistic Approach to Ballantine,” Pl.’s Ex. 9 at 
A1616, A1618-9, dated Sept. 1, 1971. 
 15. Paul Kalmanovitz arrived in America penniless in his mid-20’s and built a fortune in 
beer and real estate estimated at $250 million (enough to earn him a spot on the Forbes 400 list) 
at the time of his death in 1987.  See Burt A. Folkart, Paul Kalmanovitz, Beer Industry Magnate, 
Dies, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1987, at 28.  His treatment of Ballantine was consistent with his 
treatment of the other beer labels he acquired.  “Kalmanovitz’s reputation as a cost-cutter was so 
dreaded that employees at Falstaff Brewing’s St. Louis headquarters flew the flag upside down 
and at half-mast when they learned that [he] had taken it over in 1975.  ‘He went through Falstaff 
like Grant went through Richmond—he took no hostages,’ recalls [his successor].”  Seth Lubove, 
The Legacy of Mr. Paul, FORBES, May 1995, at 46. 
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In the meantime, IFC went into bankruptcy.  Bloor, the trustee in 
bankruptcy for IFC, filed suit against Falstaff claiming, among other things, 
that Kalmanovitz’s change of direction in 1975 violated Falstaff’s best efforts 
obligation or, alternatively, amounted to a substantial discontinuance.  There 
were some side issues related to the fact that some of Ballantine’s pre-
transaction sales volume was generated by illegal marketing practices, most of 
which were widespread in the industry, but the core of the dispute remained 
the best efforts and substantial discontinuance questions. 
B. The Contract 
Falstaff purchased the “Ballantine Assets” which were defined in the 
contract.16  These included: (a) the “Proprietary Rights,” Ballantine’s brand 
names, trademarks, trade names and copyrights; (b) Ballantine’s distribution 
network, including contracts, orders agreements, commitments, supply and 
requirements contracts, and collective bargaining agreements relating to the 
sale and delivery of its malt alcoholic beverage directly to retail sellers; (c) 
most of Ballantine’s accounts receivable; and (d) miscellaneous items 
including the existing inventory and supplies, vehicles, cooperage, returnable 
cases and bottles and similar items.  Falstaff paid $4 million cash in three 
installments, the last payment on the date of closing.  In addition, Falstaff 
would pay a royalty of fifty cents per barrel: 
on the 7th day of each month, commencing May 7, 1972, and terminating 
April 7, 1978 (the “Royalty Period”), a sum in cash computed at the rate of 
$.50 per barrel for each barrel of 31 U.S. gallons sold by the Buyer during the 
preceding calendar month under any of the Proprietary Rights, as royalties in 
respect of the use of such Proprietary Rights.17 
In addition, the clause included a liquidated damages clause that would 
have come into effect if Falstaff substantially discontinued distribution of 
Ballantine. 
. . . provided, however, that if during the Royalty Period the Buyer 
substantially discontinues the distribution of beer under the brand name 
“Ballantine” . . . , it will pay to the Seller a cash sum equal to the years and 
fraction thereof remaining in the Royalty Period times $1,100,000, payable in 
equal monthly installments on the first day of each month commencing with 
the first month following the month in which such discontinuation 
occurs . . . .18 
 
 16. Clause 1 of the contract.  The complete contract is available as Pl.’s Ex. 1 at A1584-
A1616.  In each instance Falstaff would acquire Ballantine’s “right, title, and interest,” with the 
specific items defined in separate exhibits. 
 17. Clause 2(a)(v). 
 18. Clause 2(a)(v). 
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The clause at the center of the litigation, which included a rather 
embarrassing typographical error, read as follows: “Certain Other Covenants 
of Buyer.  (a) After the Closing Date the Seller [sic!] will use its best efforts to 
promote and maintain a high volume of sales under the Proprietary Rights.”19 
This was not the only appearance of “best efforts” in the agreement.  It 
appears six other times.  Falstaff agrees to use its best efforts to keep 
confidential non-public information about the seller.20  The seller agrees that if 
any of its contracts are not assignable, it will use its best efforts to obtain 
consent of third parties.21  Falstaff agrees to use its best efforts to collect the 
seller’s receivables (a contractually defined subset of the receivables).22  The 
buyer also promises to use best efforts to collect the buyer’s receivables.23  
This is not as odd as it first appears, since the seller has some financial stake in 
the buyer’s receivables.  Falstaff also agrees to use best efforts to retain as its 
own employees Ballantine’s sales, marketing, clerical and administrative 
personnel.24  The casual usage of the phrase in these varied contexts does 
suggest a certain lack of care about its content. 
The contract provided virtually no assurance as to the quality of the assets.  
“Ballantine Assets will be sold by the seller hereunder ‘as is’ and . . . the Seller 
makes no representations or warranties of any kind with respect to the 
description, condition, merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose of 
any of the Ballantine Assets.”25 
At the closing Falstaff was to pay cash for 75% of Ballantine’s 
receivables.26  In addition, it would pay to IFC 75% of all receivables collected 
beyond that, subject to a ceiling of $7,125,000.27  There was some concern 
over the receivables since in Pennsylvania it was unlawful for beer to be sold 
on credit and at least one large receivable (Pflaumer) was from Pennsylvania.28  
The treatment of receivables, as we shall see, turned out to have some 
significance, since IFC claimed (and Judge Brieant agreed) that Falstaff’s 
payment for the receivables was part of the horse-trading involving the critical 
terms in the contract. 
 
 19. Clause 8(a). 
 20. Clause 4. 
 21. Clause 6(a). 
 22. Clause 6(b).  The phrase is used twice in this context. 
 23. Clause 8(g). 
 24. Clause 8(d). 
 25. Clause 16.  There was a limited exception for inventory, equipment, and bottles that they 
would be “useable or marketable by the Seller in accordance with its customary standards, and all 
finished malt alcoholic beverage products sold to the Buyer hereunder shall be produced under a 
high degree of quality control.”  Clause 9(f). 
 26. Clause 2(a)(vi). 
 27. Clause 2(a)(vii) and clause 2(b). 
 28. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 274-75.  At the time of closing Pflaumer owed over $800,000.  Id. 
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The contract included what amounts to an acceleration clause, requiring 
Falstaff to pay immediately all money due under the royalty clause in the event 
of its bankruptcy.29  The language is unclear, but I believe the clause means 
that the $1.1 million per year liquidated damages would be due, not the 
uncertain expected value of the sum of future royalty payments. Falstaff also 
agreed to pledge to IFC the proprietary rights (the trademarks) as security for 
the royalty payments.  If, however, such a pledge would be in violation of any 
of Falstaff’s pre-existing agreements, Falstaff will “in good faith attempt to 
obtain . . . any consents to such pledge which may be required; and if any 
required consent is unobtainable or obtainable only upon conditions 
detrimental to [Falstaff], such pledge will not be deliverable as aforesaid.  In 
such event, [Falstaff] will furnish [IFC] with such evidence as it may 
reasonably request to ascertain the reasons therefor.”30  Falstaff agreed not to 
transfer the proprietary rights during the royalty period without IFC’s written 
consent.31 
C. The Decisions 
Trial was held without a jury.32  Falstaff argued that best efforts “must 
include consideration of Falstaff’s own allegedly precarious financial position. 
Plaintiff, on the contrary, cited substantial precedent holding that financial 
difficulty and economic hardship do not excuse performance of a contract, and 
argued for the application of an objective standard, that of the ‘average, 
prudent comparable’ brewer.”33  Judge Brieant cited with approval precedent 
which would not excuse performance even in the face of financial difficulty or 
economic hardship.34  But he did not go this far.  Falstaff did not have to spend 
itself into bankruptcy to meet its contractual obligation, but it did have to meet 
the prudent comparable brewer standard, “and this it failed to do.”35 
Judge Brieant presented a litany of things Falstaff did (or failed to do) in 
failing to meet its best efforts obligation.  He cited Falstaff’s closing of four of 
its retail distribution centers, including the North Bergen facility, which, he 
 
 29. Clause 2(d). “If the Buyer shall . . . file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy . . . [or other 
bankruptcy and insolvency related conditions] then each of the payments or installments provided 
for in subparagraph (v) of paragraph (a) above shall immediately become forthwith due and 
payable without demand or other notice of any kind.” 
 30. Clause 8(b).  I suspect that nothing was intended by the use of “good faith” here as 
opposed to “best efforts” which is scattered through the remainder of the document (including 
three of the seven covenants of the buyer in clause 8). 
 31. Clause 8(e). 
 32. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 260. 
 33. Id. at 266. 
 34. Insolvency or bankruptcy does not excuse performance of a contract.  While the point is 
correct, it would take a large leap of logic to apply it to interpretation of the best efforts language. 
 35. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 267. 
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said, had been losing about $2.2 million annually distributing Falstaff and 
Ballantine products.36  He criticized Falstaff’s shifting from a distribution 
system which sold to a large number of retail accounts, to one selling to a 
small number of wholesale accounts, in particular the assignment of the New 
York market to a particular distributor (Fatato) and Falstaff’s failure to accept 
a different one (Molyneux).37  The judge also criticized Falstaff’s severe 
“cutback of personnel in distribution, sales, marketing, administrative and 
warehousing areas.  It virtually eliminated its promotion and advertising of 
Ballantine Beer and closed its advertising department.”38  He quoted, and 
implicitly criticized, Kalmanovitz’s description of his marketing strategy: 
  We sell beer and you pay for it . . . . We sell beer, F. O. B. the brewery.  
You come and get it. 
  Our responsibility is to give good product and you got responsibility to pay 
for it.  That’s it.  That’s the substance of my arrangement.  Its working.39 
Falstaff had not, the court held, treated Ballantine equally.  Even if they 
had, the court held, that would not have been enough. 
Falstaff’s relationship to Ballantine is essentially different from its relationship 
to its own products. In the latter case, it may promote, continue or discontinue 
its products as it wills, subject to its duty to shareholders; in the former case it 
is bound by a contractual duty to the promisee.  As the court said in a case 
cited by the defendant here: “‘[B]est energies’ meant such effort as in the 
exercise of sound judgment would be likely to produce the most profitable 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. In any event, after May 1976, any inability to appoint such an exclusive distributor in 
the New York area was caused by the fault or negligence of Falstaff. To the extent such 
fault or negligence prevented it from using effective marketing methods in the area which 
Molyneux proposed to serve, it is answerable in damages to Ballantine. 
*  *  * 
  Mr. Kalmanovitz as a traditional businessman expressed at trial his contempt for 
‘studies’ and ‘projections.’ Consequently, in making the decisions to close the North 
Bergen facility and to appoint Mr. Fatato distributor in the New York City area, no effort 
was made to ascertain in advance the effect on Ballantine sales . . . . Falstaff was willing 
to appoint a distributor for the area, Mr. Fatato, about whose abilities the President of 
Falstaff had serious reservations, and to continue him in a virtual monopoly of Falstaff 
products in the area despite Mr. Molyneux’s proposals. These actions exceed any 
reasonable variance allowable in the exercise of sound business judgment. No effort was 
made by Falstaff to examine or find alternatives to the drastic step of closing the North 
Bergen facility, although it accounted for a very large percentage of Ballantine sales. 
Id. at 269. 
 38. Id. at 270.  Note that if this violated the best efforts obligation to sell Ballantine it likely 
would have also violated the best efforts obligation to keep employed the Ballantine personnel.  
Id. at 269. 
 39. Bloor, 454 F.Supp at 270. 
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results to the promisee in view of the nature of the business and the extent of 
the territory over which it was to be conducted.” 40 
Moreover, he suggested, Falstaff’s incentives favored promoting Falstaff at 
the expense of Ballantine. 
Some of this apparent callousness towards Ballantine sales is undoubtedly 
caused by the fact that even though the liquid in a can of Ballantine Beer and 
in a can of Falstaff Beer is identical, and accordingly costs exactly the same 
amount to produce, sale of Falstaff Beer produces a greater profit for Falstaff. 
In part this is the result of the fact that Falstaff is a “premium” beer and nets 
Falstaff about $4.20 more a barrel than does Ballantine, even before the $.50 
Ballantine royalty is subtracted from the latter.41 
Judge Brieant did side with Falstaff in rejecting Bloor’s claim that 
Falstaff’s behavior amounted to substantial discontinuance of Ballantine.  
Falstaff had continued to distribute beer under the Ballantine name and had 
introduced Ballantine in other markets.  Ballantine’s sales had dropped 
dramatically.  However: 
[a] very significant part of this decline is attributable . . . to the general decline 
of the market share of the smaller brewers, and to other causes unconnected 
with Falstaff’s closing of the North Bergen facility. The remaining decline is 
regarded as “insubstantial” under the contract. It is clear from the royalty rate 
established in the contract itself that the liquidated damages clause was 
included to cover situations approaching the total cessation of Ballantine 
production, rather than situations involving gradual but significant declines in 
sales.42 
Damages were calculated by subtracting Ballantine’s actual sales from the 
sales that would have been made had Falstaff used its best efforts (as 
determined by the court).43  The court accepted the expert witness’s estimate, 
which was based on the assumption that Ballantine’s sales would have 
followed the same trend as two other small New York labels, Schaefer and 
Rheingold.  After some modest deductions, primarily to exclude Ballantine 
sales that were the product of illegal activities, the judge concluded that the 
royalties lost by Ballantine were approximately $630,000.  Falstaff had 
withheld royalties during the litigation and these too were awarded, bringing 
the final judgment to about $1.3 million.44 
Falstaff appealed the best efforts ruling and Bloor appealed the rejection of 
the substantial discontinuance claim.  Judge Friendly, speaking for a 
 
 40. Id. at 270-71 (quoting Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 99 N.E. 221, 226 (Mass. 
1912)). 
 41. Id. at 269-70. 
 42. Id. at 266. 
 43. Id. at 280. 
 44. Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 281. 
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unanimous court, affirmed.  He restated Judge Brieant’s conclusion, softening 
it a bit.  Brieant’s decision might have been interpreted as requiring Falstaff to 
continue promoting Ballantine regardless of the financial consequences.  
Friendly made clear, however, that “best efforts” did not mean that Falstaff 
must go to these lengths.  But it did have a special duty to promote Ballantine 
beer sales. 
While [the best efforts] clause clearly required Falstaff to treat the Ballantine 
brands as well as its own, it does not follow that it required no more. With 
respect to its own brands, management was entirely free to exercise its 
business judgment as to how to maximize profit even if this meant serious loss 
in volume.  Because of the obligation it had assumed under the sales contract, 
its situation with respect to the Ballantine brands was quite different.  The 
royalty of $.50 a barrel on sales was an essential part of the purchase price.  
Even without the best efforts clause Falstaff would have been bound to make a 
good faith effort to see that substantial sales of Ballantine products were made, 
unless it discontinued under clause 2(a)(v) with consequent liability for 
liquidated damages . . . . Clause 8 imposed an added obligation to use “best 
efforts to promote and maintain a high volume of sales . . . .”  (emphasis 
supplied). Although we agree that even this did not require Falstaff to spend 
itself into bankruptcy to promote the sales of Ballantine products, it did 
prevent the application to them of Kalmanovitz’ philosophy of emphasizing 
profit über alles without fair consideration of the effect on Ballantine volume.  
Plaintiff was not obliged to show just what steps Falstaff could reasonably 
have taken to maintain a high volume for Ballantine products.  It was sufficient 
to show that Falstaff simply didn’t care about Ballantine’s volume and was 
content to allow this to plummet so long as that course was best for Falstaff’s 
overall profit picture, an inference which the judge permissibly drew.  The 
burden then shifted to Falstaff to prove there was nothing significant it could 
have done to promote Ballantine sales that would not have been financially 
disastrous.45 
II. THE DEAL 
Judges Friendly and Brieant take it as axiomatic that the contract required 
Falstaff to trade off its profits for Ballantine’s sales.  Conspicuous by its 
absence in their decisions is any analysis of why the contract included the 
royalty arrangement and the best efforts covenant.  That is not entirely the fault 
of the judges, as the record was completely silent on this point.  So, we are left 
with the somewhat peculiar spectacle of a court giving meaning to a context-
sensitive phrase with no guidance as to the context.  The context dictates how 
“best efforts” should have been interpreted.  Had the court recognized that the 
royalty was, in effect, an “earnout,” ancillary to the one-shot sale of some of 
 
 45. Bloor, 601 F.2d at 614-15. 
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Ballantine’s assets to Falstaff, the outcome would have (or, at least, should 
have) been different. 
An earnout makes part of the payment for an asset contingent upon some 
measure of future performance.  Often it is a function of profits; here, it is a 
function of sales.  Most corporate acquisitions do not involve earnouts.  In 
1998, of the over 9,000 acquisitions, only 153 included an earnout.46  They 
would make little sense in the sale of a public corporation with numerous 
shareholders and where the seller ceases to exist as an entity.  Here, where the 
seller is a private entity, which survives the transaction, it is more likely that 
the parties would choose to use an earnout.  Earnouts rarely show up in 
appellate litigation; a Lexis search found only forty-two cases.47  That might 
not adequately indicate the frequency with which they generate disputes.  I 
suspect, based in part on my consulting experience, that the disputes are far 
more common, but that they arise in arbitrations, not litigation.48 
IFC was, essentially, selling two assets—Ballantine’s brand name (the 
proprietary rights) and its distribution network.  IFC’s purpose was simple; it 
wanted to sell at the highest price.  That should be obvious, but the court’s 
failure to recognize this basic point is the core of the problem.  Falstaff 
purchased the proprietary rights in order to exploit them efficiently.  By 
maintaining the flexibility to respond to new information as it appears, Falstaff 
increases the amount it would be willing to pay Ballantine for the right to 
exploit the brand name.  Other things equal, the fewer post-sale restrictions on 
Falstaff’s exploitation of the assets, the more Falstaff would be willing to pay.  
Falstaff’s pursuit of  “profit über alles,” ex post, redounds to IFC’s benefit, ex 
ante.  So, any restriction, like the best efforts clause, immediately raises a red 
flag: how might the particular restriction raise the value of the Ballantine 
assets, ex ante? 
A. The Earnout 
Falstaff could have purchased the Ballantine assets outright rather than 
spreading the compensation over six years and making the payment contingent 
upon Ballantine sales.  Why did they choose the latter course?  There are three 
plausible reasons for using an earnout: (1) the seller is also filling the role of 
financier; (2) the seller is providing a bond for a promise not to engage in post-
sale activities that would adversely affect the value of the assets to the buyer; 
 
 46. For the number of deals, see 1998 M&A Profile, 33 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 42 
(1999).  For the number including earnouts, see Deal Structuring: Earn-Outs Get Into More 
Deals, 33 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 35 (1999). 
 47. Lexis search, January 10, 2000. 
 48. In the last year I was involved, briefly, as a potential expert witness in two arbitrations 
concerning the interpretation of an earnout clause.  On earnouts, see generally Mark D. Gerstein, 
Earnouts: An Outline of Key Issues, 1059 PLI/CORP 763 (1998). 
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and (3) the parties are responding to the information asymmetry.  In this 
instance, the third is most plausible. 
Ballantine was, in effect, making a six-year loan to Falstaff.  The security 
arrangements and acceleration clause discussed above49 are manifestations of 
this.  A loan would make sense only if Falstaff could get terms at least as 
favorable from IFC as from alternative sources.50  If restrictions in its existing 
capital structure—debt covenants and the like—constrained Falstaff, spreading 
the payments over time might have been a simple way of financing the 
transaction without violating the constraints.51  A Falstaff planning document 
entitled “Ballantine Observations” hinted at some of the financing 
considerations: 
6. Falstaff’s financing of this purchase —What form would it take—would it 
take external financing, stock issue, additional long-term debt, what is the 
availability of any of the forms of financing and what would it cost and 
what restrictions would it place upon our operations. 
5.  The present debt agreements 
a. Do they allow this type of acquisition and when must these 
insurance companies be notified that we are considering such 
action. 
6. The stockholder approval—What would be the mechanics here—what is 
the timing of such notification and what are the consequences of our 
announcing such to the stockholders in light of our present earnings 
situation and that of the last few years.52 
While spreading the payments over time might be a perfectly sensible way to 
finance the project, financing considerations cannot explain why the payments 
were contingent upon Ballantine sales.  Something more is necessary to 
explain why IFC in its role as financier would choose to take neither a fixed 
return nor an equity position in Falstaff. 
Earnouts are sometimes used to discourage the seller’s management from 
engaging in post-sale actions detrimental to the buyer.  Ballantine’s managers 
would provide a bond to Falstaff to assure that they would not by their future 
actions reduce the value of the Ballantine trademark.  Suppose that the top 
management of Ballantine had developed some good will with the beer market.  
The value of the brand name they were selling would be impaired if they could 
 
 49. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. 
 50. If the costs of litigation are high, spreading the payments over time would give Falstaff 
some leverage to bargain down its future obligations.  Deferral changes the status quo for 
subsequent litigation. 
 51. It is always possible that the structure of a transaction reflects tax consequences; I do not 
know of any in this instance and the record gave no indication of any. 
 52. Pl.’s Ex. 14 at A1624-25, dated Jan. 8, 1972. 
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subsequently re-enter and compete against Ballantine.  A promise not to 
compete would, if enforceable, make the Ballantine assets more valuable.  
Giving these managers an interest in Ballantine’s future sales or profits could 
substitute for, or complement, the non-compete covenant.  The problem with 
this explanation, of course, is that the outgoing Ballantine executives had no 
competence in the beer industry53 or expectation of staying in the beer 
industry; and Falstaff knew it.  A promise not to compete, or any variant 
thereon, would have been worthless. 
The earnout was a response to the problem of asymmetric information.  In 
sales of complex assets the seller typically has more information than the 
prospective buyer.54  If buyers cannot distinguish good assets from bad, then 
they are likely to be suspicious of any particular asset and to reduce their offer 
price accordingly.  If the seller believes his asset to be sound, then conveying 
that information to the buyer can result in a higher net price.  The parties have 
an incentive to economize on the joint production of information.  By 
accepting some of its compensation in a contingent form, the seller provides 
some assurance to the buyer of the quality of the asset.  Instead of insisting 
upon elaborate representations and warranties or engaging in extensive due 
diligence, Falstaff bought the Ballantine assets “as is” with over half the 
expected cost contingent upon future sales. 
The parties want an arrangement which maximizes the value to the buyer 
ex ante.  But producing information and assurance is not costless.  The process 
of maximizing the value of the asset can reduce the size of the joint pie.  That 
would obviously be true if the parties had spent months negotiating elaborate 
representations and warranties and/or engaging in a due diligence 
investigation.  In this instance the parties avoided these costs using the royalty 
payment instead.  It, too, is not costless.  Earnouts, generally, have a number of 
value-reducing features.  They do not track value perfectly; they can distort 
 
 53. Judge Brieant accurately characterized IFC’s competence in the beer business: 
Mr. Donald Orenstein was Executive Vice-President of Investors Funding Corporation 
and of P. Ballantine & Sons at the time the negotiations with Falstaff took place. He 
testified at trial to the IFC management’s complete lack of experience in the brewing 
industry. His own career began with IFC as a clerk, and ultimately he became President of 
IFC Realty Service. He stated at trial his views on IFC’s acquisition of Ballantine (Tr. p. 
124): “Q. When did it become apparent to you that Investors Funding should sell P. 
Ballantine & Company? A. The second day that I arrived at P. Ballantine, in ‘69. He (Mr. 
Jerome Dansker, Chairman of the Board of IFC) bought it on a Thursday; I told him 
Friday to sell it.” 
Bloor, 454 F. Supp. at 263 n.6. 
 54. See Victor P. Goldberg, The Gold Ring Problem, 47 U. TORONTO L. J. 469 (1997).  The 
article analyzes the case in which the buyer might have superior information.  Ballantine had 
superior information about the quality of its assets, but Falstaff had superior information about its 
plans on how to use those assets.  Contingent compensation allows the seller to capture some of 
the gains despite its relative ignorance about the buyer’s plans.  Id. 
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incentives; and they are not strategy-proof—that is, the buyer can operate the 
business in a way that exploits the mechanism.  For example, if an earnout 
were based on profits in the first three years, the buyer could make investment 
decisions which shift profits from the third to the fourth year.  Anticipation of 
these costs will reduce the final price of the asset.  If the best efforts clause 
means anything,55 its role would be to prevent the buyer from taking undue 
advantage of the earnout. 
Falstaff bought the Ballantine trademarks in order to exploit them.  As 
Falstaff’s CEO at the time of the transaction, Robert Colson, testified: 
The intention when we went into this deal was to use our best efforts, and 
that’s exactly what it says there.  We were going to go out and do our best 
efforts to promote the brand, or why would we have bought the brand?  You 
don’t buy something with the intention that you’re going to abandon it.  If you 
did, then you spend a lot of time wasting your time.56 
Conceivably, Falstaff could have bought the Ballantine brand name with the 
intention of eliminating Ballantine as a competitor.  Since Falstaff was not in 
the New York market and the two beers were targeted at different customers, 
this would not have been a concern of the parties.  However, during the life of 
the earnout, Falstaff could have combined with another brewer with a 
significant presence in the New York market; the best efforts clause could be 
viewed as protecting against that contingency. 
The royalty acts as a tax (roughly 2%)57 on sales, which could induce 
Falstaff to market a somewhat smaller amount of Ballantine product than it 
would have, but for the royalty.  So “best efforts” might possibly mean that 
Falstaff should push its sales effort a bit beyond the point that would otherwise 
be optimal.  The distortion of incentives, which in this instance is quite minor, 
is a common problem in contingent compensation arrangements (franchise 
fees, percentage leases, oil and gas royalties, and so forth) and “best efforts” is 
just one of the devices for dealing with the problem. 
The more likely function was to police diversion.  Falstaff bought two sets 
of assets: the proprietary rights and the distribution network.  But the earnout 
was related only to the value of the former.  Ballantine’s owners had some 
reason for concern on this score.  Falstaff was, after all, attempting to break 
into the New York market to sell its own brand and Ballantine’s owners were 
aware of this prospect.58  Had Falstaff simply jettisoned the Ballantine brand 
 
 55. The liberal use of the term in the contract suggests that it was little more than filler. 
 56. Colson’s Test. at 1099. 
 57. Ballantine’s 1970 price was $26.60 per barrel and the royalty rate was fifty cents per 
barrel.  Pl.’s Ex. 9 at 1618. 
 58. On Falstaff’s interest in the distribution network, see supra note 14 and accompanying 
text.  On Ballantine’s awareness, see the testimony of Melvin Carro, of Falstaff: “There was an 
expression of concern stated by somebody on the Ballantine side that possibly Falstaff would use 
the Ballantine distribution system to come into the New York area, and then for reasons of its 
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entirely and used the distribution network to distribute Falstaff beer instead, 
Falstaff would not simply be maximizing the value of the asset (the distribution 
network)—it would be diverting payment for that asset.  The royalty 
arrangement would fail completely in its purpose.59  More generally, to the 
extent that Falstaff could use the distribution network to sell Falstaff rather 
than Ballantine, the royalty would not track the value of the asset. 
A “best efforts” requirement is one contractual device for protecting 
against this sort of diversion.  But the context suggests how the clause should 
be read.  “Best efforts” in this context means that Falstaff agreed that in its 
pursuit of “profit über alles” it would not opportunistically divert sales from 
Ballantine (the sales of which were to track asset value) to Falstaff.  Did 
Falstaff use the network to divert more sales than the parties should reasonably 
have expected?  That might be a difficult question to answer for some fact 
patterns, but for the facts of this case the answer is easy and negative.  When 
Kalmanovitz took charge he dismantled the distribution system.  The evidence 
Judge Brieant relied on to document what he believed to be Falstaff’s lack of 
best efforts supports the conclusion that Falstaff did not exploit a loophole in 
the earnout.  Falstaff did not divert resources to the more profitable brand; it 
simply terminated (or at least drastically pared) a project that did not work. 
So, we are left with three plausible meanings of “best efforts” in the 
context of this transaction.  First, it could be aimed at preventing Falstaff from 
abandoning the brand following a merger with a brewer with a significant 
presence in the New York market.  Second, it might have been an attempt to 
correct Falstaff’s incentives, which were a bit distorted by the royalty “tax.”  
Third, and the most plausible, it could have been an attempt to limit diversion 
of revenue away from the device chosen to provide assurance of that value.  
None provides a basis for concluding that Falstaff’s pursuit of profit über alles, 
by revising its Ballantine marketing strategy and dismantling much of the 
Ballantine distribution network, violated its obligation to Ballantine. 
This is a simple and, I believe, compelling story.  There is only one 
problem with it.  It is not the story told by the witnesses or counsel.  That does 
not make it wrong; but it does raise the questions of how courts are supposed 
to figure it out and, if they do, what they should do about it.  That problem is 
compounded by the “substantial discontinuance” proviso, which can be 
explained, but the explanation is neither so simple nor compelling.  After 
 
own, it might be possible . . . that Falstaff would concentrate on the sales of Falstaff, and either 
abandon or let the Ballantine beer sales diminish.”  Carro’s Test. at A1074-75. 
 59. For completeness, we can identify another diversion possibility.  Instead of selling 
Ballantine beer under the proprietary rights, Falstaff might have sold Ballantine pretzels or 
clothing or some other non-beer trademarked articles.  They did not, so I need not pursue the 
matter further here. 
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attempting to make some sense of the proviso, I will return to the problem of 
decision-making by an ill-informed court. 
B. Substantial Discontinuance 
It is common to couple royalty payment schemes with minimum payment 
obligations. 
Such arrangements are common in publishing and movies  (talent receive 
royalties or a percentage of the gross to be offset against a bargained for fixed 
fee),60 licensing agreements, franchising, shopping center and other retail 
leases, and so forth.  It is tempting to assume that such arrangements would 
make sense in the sale of an asset, as in the present case.  Indeed, my initial 
presumption was that the “substantial discontinuance” clause was a poorly 
drafted attempt to create a minimum obligation.  However, I was wrong.  The 
minimum does not add anything useful for the sale of an asset where the seller, 
like Ballantine, has no interest in, or affect upon, the outcomes other than the 
receipt of its compensation. 
Up to the minimum, the effective tax rate is zero.  Incentives still are 
distorted at the margin, but a high minimum means that at least over a broad 
range, the buyer’s incentives are not distorted.  But the higher the minimum, 
the weaker the quality assurance provided by the royalty.  A high minimum 
undercuts the quality assurance function since the purchaser must pay 
regardless of quality.  So, while a minimum annual payment might help correct 
the tax distortion of the per barrel royalty, it does so only by undercutting the 
purpose. 
A minimum guarantee might conceivably be of a bit more use in policing 
diversion.  If the parties were indeed concerned with the possibility that 
Falstaff would use the Ballantine distribution network to distribute Falstaff 
beer, a minimum obligation would have imposed a sharp limit on Falstaff’s 
ability to do so.  But if the advantage of distributing Falstaff were substantial 
(recall Judge Brieant’s claim that in addition to the fifty cents per barrel 
royalty, the identical beer sold for $4.50 more per barrel when labeled 
Falstaff),61 then Falstaff would have had a strong incentive to treat the 
minimum as a target.  The royalty would serve no particular function. 
 
 60. On publishing contracts, see Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of 
Markets, 25 J. L. & ECON. 27, 34-35 (1982); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Hands-
Tying Contracts: Book Publishing, Venture Capital Financing, and Secured Debt, 8 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 628 (1992).  On gross profits compensation in movies, see Victor Goldberg, The Net 
Profits Puzzle, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 524, 546-49. 
 61. A price differential of around 20% is not trivial.  However, we should recognize that 
brewers engage in a form of (legal) price discrimination by targeting different groups with beers 
priced accordingly.  There is no reason to believe that Falstaff could sell its brand to the “price 
beer” market reached by the Ballantine brand and maintain the price differential. 
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Ballantine asked for a minimum guarantee, but Falstaff refused.  
Ballantine’s Orenstein testified: 
Falstaff was never willing to give us a guarantee of a million one.  They said 
they would use their best efforts . . . they didn’t give us really, what we 
wanted.  We wanted a million one guarantee, that if for any reason the sales 
dropped below fifty cents a barrel times two million two . . . we would be 
guaranteed at least, a million one, and that’s not in the contract. 
Q.  It did not get in there? 
A.  No. We traded that off.  It did not get in there.62 
Although the contract did not include a minimum guarantee, it did include 
liquidated damages of $1.1 million per year (the same amount Ballantine had 
been asking as the minimum) in the event of Falstaff’s substantial 
discontinuance of Ballantine.  If this proviso were included as part of the 
quality assurance mechanism, as I first thought, it makes no sense.  In effect, it 
says: if the assets are really terrible so that they are unusable, then Falstaff pays 
Ballantine $1.1 million per year for the duration; if on the other hand, they are 
only pretty bad, Falstaff pays less.  That is a perverse result, which I thought, 
could only be explained by poor drafting. 
However, the clause makes more sense if it is viewed as being independent 
of the quality of the proprietary rights and instead concerns diversion of 
revenues from the exploitation of Ballantine’s distribution network.  Falstaff 
says, in effect: we agree that we will not cheat you by diverting receipts from 
the metering device (Ballantine sales) and profiting by the use of the other 
valuable asset we have purchased, your distribution network; if we have done 
too much diversion, we agree to pay a penalty (although the law does not 
permit us to call it that).63  The trigger for the penalty would not be the quantity 
of Ballantine sold nationally.  Rather, it would be the percentage of Ballantine 
being sold through the old Ballantine network. 
But this mechanism had one big hole.  What if the network itself turned out 
to be of little or no value?  Falstaff essentially abandoned the network, but 
continued to exploit the proprietary rights as best it could.  If the proviso’s 
purpose was to thwart massive diversion of revenues, there was no diversion.  
 
 62. Orenstein’s Dep. at A1465-66.  Falstaff’s attorney made the same point: 
During the negotiations, P. Ballantine & Sons attempted to elicit from Falstaff a guarantee 
as to the minimum royalty that would be paid to Ballantine, and Falstaff staunchly 
resisted any effort to force a minimum payment of royalties, and so the contract read that 
there would be only best efforts required of Falstaff Brewing Corporation. 
Falstaff Att’y at A60. 
 63. Falstaff’s Reply Brief raised, somewhat half-heartedly, the possibility that the proviso 
might be a penalty clause: “[A] construction of the proviso that would give it effect in any 
circumstances other than the near total cessation of Ballantine production would make of it, not a 
liquidated damages provision, but an unenforceable penalty clause.”  Falstaff’s Reply Br. at 37. 
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Falstaff bore the direct risk of the distribution network being a lemon; it seems 
unlikely that ex ante the parties would have wanted Falstaff to post an 
additional bond against that prospect.  But, and this must be emphasized, it is 
most likely that neither party expected the distribution network to be worth so 
little, and the contract reflected their failure to anticipate this possibility. 
III. SO, WHAT’S A POOR COURT TO DO? 
The parties did not give the court much assistance in framing the case.  
This is, I believe, less a matter of the peculiar way in which facts percolate up 
through the judicial system than of genuine confusion.  Orenstein’s testimony 
on the origins of the controversial terms is indicative: 
In substance what happened is that we just couldn’t get together on those three 
items.  It was the accounts receivables, the best efforts, and . . . the words 
substantial discontinuance.  What does that really mean? How does one 
determine that?  Can’t we put in a formula?  No, we won’t give you a formula; 
we don’t want to attach ourselves to anything.  That’s Colson’s exact words.  
We told him, How can we make a deal not knowing where we’re going?  He 
said, Well, you have to believe that we’re experts in the beer business for so 
many years; you’re not selling to us just to collect a million one, you’re going 
to look to us to collect much more, and we’ll be able to increase the sales. 
  I said, Well, if that’s the way you feel, why don’t you write it?  He said, 
No, he’s not prepared to do that.  They have certain standards under which 
they do deals, and that’s one of them.  They didn’t want to put it in writing, but 
that’s how we came to the receivable.  I said, If that’s the feeling, give me 
something.  Take my receivables.  He said, Maybe we’ll do that.  That’s how 
the next dialogue started.  They then recessed. . . . 
  I told [my colleagues] that the substantial discontinuance thing bothers me.  
What does that mean?  Should we put in a percentage?  Do you think we 
should try for a percentage?  Then we all collectively said, in our minds, 30 
percent would be considered a substantial discontinuance.  I went back and 
mentioned that figure and they laughed.  There was no way they would do it.64 
Ballantine’s lawyers asked various witnesses what best efforts meant to 
them and whether it meant more than good faith, a sterile inquiry designed to 
wrench damning statements out of the mouths of unwary witnesses.  But 
neither side ever framed the question in terms of the underlying purpose of the 
transaction: sale of an asset of uncertain value.  Counsel never even hinted at 
the possibility that the dismantling of the Ballantine distribution network 
should count in favor of Falstaff, instead of counting against it.  The courts 
accepted the parties’ terms of debate. 
 
 64. Otenstein’s Test. at A1473-74. 
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This was not inevitable; a court with a confident understanding of what the 
deal was about could easily have framed the best efforts question properly and 
disposed of it cleanly.  From the contractual context, the plausible meanings of 
best efforts were narrowly circumscribed and under both those meanings, 
Falstaff had satisfied its obligation.  The substantial discontinuance proviso 
presents a more difficult problem.  Still, the most plausible explanation 
concerns the diversion of the revenue from the Ballantine distribution network; 
given the purpose of the transaction, we might reasonably infer that shutting 
down that network completely would not constitute a substantial 
discontinuance. 
I am not suggesting that courts should ignore contract language and 
attempt to determine the parties’ true intent.  Rather, I am suggesting that when 
contract language is context sensitive,  the court should use that context in 
interpreting the contract.  The emphasis should not be on what these parties 
meant, but on what reasonable people in this situation should have meant.  So, 
even if Orenstein’s testimony regarding the origins of the substantial 
discontinuance was accurate and the best efforts language was lifted from a 
form book with the parties giving it no mind, that should not matter in 
interpreting the agreement.  We ought not, in Judge Easterbrook’s colorful 
phrase, invite “a tour through Walters’ cranium with Walters as the guide.”65 
The starting point should be this: a rational seller would not want the buyer 
to promise to use the asset sub-optimally.  It makes little sense to have an 
interpretative strategy that presumed such an irrational policy.  An 
interpretation of a contract that begins with the presumption that the seller 
intended to restrict the buyer’s subsequent use of the asset, is bound to fail 
unless there is an understanding of the possible gains from tying the buyer’s 
hands. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Generally speaking, giving content to an amorphous concept like “best 
efforts” is extremely difficult.  Even in this contract, in which “best efforts” 
was invoked seven times and “good faith” once, it is hard to determine how a 
court should respond to claims that particular best efforts obligations had not 
been met.  How, for example, should one deal with a complaint that Falstaff 
had failed to meet its best efforts obligation to maintain as its own employees 
Ballantine’s sales, marketing, clerical and administrative personnel?  
Ironically, while the problem is generally difficult or intractable, in the one 
case that has filtered down to the casebook level, the problem turns out to be 
an easy one.  The context—a one-shot sale of assets—delimits the feasible 
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meanings of “best efforts” and both of the meanings lead to the same 
conclusion: the courts got it wrong. 
Again, I must emphasize, I am not asking courts to ferret out the true intent 
of the parties.  People do often enter into foolish deals and it would be 
disastrous for courts to continually second-guess their choices.  But where the 
language is inherently ambiguous, the court should not impose an irrational 
agreement upon the parties.  The peculiar feature of Bloor is that the way the 
controversy was framed made the irrational seem natural to the litigators, the 
courts and the commentators.  When the irrational seems natural it is time to 
re-think how we got there and to seek a better alternative. 
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